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Edge Cases

Scenario: a large share of investors attempt redeem-style exits in a short time window.

Expected behavior:

  • Each exit uses the same conversion mechanics for that position.
  • Wrapper and strategy liquidity governs immediate execution capacity.
  • Circuit breaker can throttle outflow velocity.
  • Processing may stretch over time if upstream liquidity is constrained.

Mass redemption is not a death spiral. Each redemption is self-balancing. The last person to redeem gets the same rate as the first.

Design intent is to avoid first-mover-only extraction by preserving deterministic conversion rules and applying controlled outflow limits.

Scenario: strategy-layer exploit or severe loss event.

Expected behavior:

  • Reported strategy value drops.
  • Exit paths continue, but payouts settle against actual remaining collateral.
  • Loss is isolated to the affected raise context.

Circuit breaker may activate to throttle outflows and prevent front-running.

Principal protection is designed against project-token downside, not against reserve depletion from upstream strategy compromise.

Scenario: oracle feed is stale, zero, or invalid.

Expected behavior:

  • New deposits are blocked/reverted.
  • Existing position exits remain available through conversion math and reserve state.

Oracle outage prevents new money in, but never prevents money out.

In the current model, deposit-time pricing depends on oracle input, while exit execution does not require fresh market price reads in the same way.

Scenario: reserve collateral is below expected target (loss event, accounting issue, or exceptional market condition).

Expected behavior:

  • Exits settle against real available collateral and conversion constraints.
  • Outflow controls can be used to slow panic/exploit velocity.

The system never promises a fixed dollar amount per position. It promises your proportional share of whatever is in the pool. In normal operation this equals your deposit. In a shortfall it equals your proportional share of what remains.

Scenario: project team becomes inactive.

Expected behavior:

  • User exit rights remain on-chain and user callable.
  • Strategy may continue accruing yield passively.
  • Yield collection is permissionless — anyone can trigger the claim function.
  • Administrative pull/operations paths (for example buyback execution) may halt if no operator acts.

The platform is designed so that investor exit never depends on the project team being active.

Scenario: strategy cannot provide full requested liquidity immediately.

Expected behavior:

  • Availability checks reflect constrained withdrawal capacity.
  • Calls may partially succeed at lower layers or revert in exact-amount flows.
  • Users can retry as liquidity conditions improve.

This is a temporary delay, not a loss. The capital exists — it is lent out.

Scenario: outflow exceeds configured limits.

Expected behavior:

  • Withdrawal velocity is limited according to breaker buffers and config.
  • Once capacity replenishes, withdrawals resume at normal pace.

Circuit breaker is a velocity control, not a permanent lock on user exits.

Scenario: integer division leaves residual dust.

Expected behavior:

  • Rounding always favors the protocol (reserve), never the individual. The amounts are negligible (wei-level).
  • Small residual balances can remain until final cleanup/sweep operations.

Scenario: compromised or malicious admin flow.

Mitigations in current design direction:

  • Multisig-admin model
  • Delayed admin rotation acceptance
  • Controlled upgrade authorization paths

Residual trust assumptions still exist around upgrade governance and operational key management.